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passion, nonproliferation, as becomes
clear when the book concludes with
a series of policy recommendations.
While there are a few ideas involving
nuclear force posture or arms limitation, such as a ban on forward nuclear
deployments, the thrust of the package
is on preventive nonproliferation.
These are real weaknesses. But they
do not detract from the real strengths
here that commend this as a worthy
addition to the nuclear weapons
literature. At its best, Underestimated
succeeds admirably in synthesizing the
swirling policy debates surrounding
these complex and interrelated issues,
framing them in a wider context
that is also widely accessible.
DAVID COOPER

Justice and the Just War Tradition: Human Worth,
Moral Formation, and Armed Conflict, by Christopher Eberle. New York: Routledge, 2016. 252
pages. $140.

War presents many opportunities
and temptations to do wrong and to
choose injustice and evil over good.
How are we to know how to act when
situations are not black-and-white, or
when emotions cloud our judgment?
These questions are not new, and the
discussion surrounding them has been
going on since Saint Augustine of Hippo
penned the first recognizable form of
just war theory in the fifth century.
Philosopher Christopher Eberle brings
his clear thought and humble wit to
the discussion using his particular
viewpoint as both a professor at the
U.S. Naval Academy and a Christian.
Viewing the just war tradition as the best
available framework for reflecting on the
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morality of war, Eberle aims to “provide
a conceptual and propositional resource
that citizens, soldiers, and statesmen can
employ as an aid to moral formation.”
This book is a natural outgrowth of his
weighty responsibility to form the morals of the nation’s future warrior-leaders.
What makes his voice particularly worth
listening to about this topic is that, while
he is a philosopher interested in discussing ideas, he translates these ideas into
practical wisdom using historical and
generic examples that are easy to follow
for anyone interested in the topic. This
book is valuable to a range of people,
from undergraduates through adult
learners who have a basic familiarity with just war theory to seasoned
experts in the field. Dr. Eberle brings
a Christian element into a discussion
that is often bereft of it, as well as an
examination of the interior mind and
intent, which also are often ignored.
Eberle’s Christian faith is valuable in
that he presents just war theory from
the perspective out of which it was
created: the heart of Western Christianity. This brings us to his second aim:
“to provide an understanding of the
morality of war that is open to religious
contributions both to the justification
and limitation of military violence.”
This is particularly important given how
Osama Bin Laden framed the events of
September 11, 2001—as religious “just
war.” It is only by considering a just war
theory reunited with religion that one
can meet these claims accurately and
reveal them as false. This reunification
of just war theory and religion is the
raw material that forms the core of what
Eberle uses to guide all decision making
with regard to right action in war.
In his discussion, Eberle focuses
narrowly on the justificatory and
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motivational core of just war theory.
These are the main concepts that draw
the boundaries or build the framework
for any discussion about whether a war
is just. Their purpose is to shape the way
we perceive and discipline our minds
and hearts about violent communal
conflict so as to conduct ourselves justly
when we find ourselves involved.
One of the basic elements of Eberle’s
application of just war theory is the
idea that every human life has great and
equal worth. Human beings are created
as moral agents who naturally want to
be good and to do good in their moral
relations with others. However, every
human being is also a sinner who at
times chooses evil as a “good”—resulting
in acts of violence around the world.
Morally speaking, any violence that kills
a human being deprives him or her of
this inherent worth and must be seen
as a moral wrong. And just as violence
by one human being against another
is morally wrong, organized violence
by one human community against
another is morally impermissible.
There are times, however, when this
can be overridden, including when one
community commits an act or a series
of egregious acts that seriously injures
another community. According to
Eberle, the victimized community can
incur an obligation for war to correct
the moral injustice. This obligation
can be overridden, however, when the
evils the war would cause or create
exceed the moral good sought.
Eberle shows how just war theory can
be used to determine the threshold
for egregious action that gives
justification for war; what constitutes
a proportional response; what actions,
thoughts, and emotions in warfare are
and are not morally permissible; and
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when warfare must be stopped. His
discussion of each of these topics is
tidy, conversational, and a delight to
read—fulfilling the book’s goal of being
a practical handbook to guide citizens,
statesmen, and soldiers in making right
moral decisions when it comes to war.
The book’s most controversial aspect is
its conclusion. After artfully building
the case for a just war theory, Eberle
muddies the waters by writing: “Reliance
on the [theory] tempts its adherents to
amplify the destructiveness of war in
morally troubling respects. When . . .
human beings are caught up in violent
communal conflict, their adherence
to the just war theory can render
them less likely to fight in accord with
the demands of justice than would
otherwise be the case.” He continues,
writing that “this deficiency is not
merely a contingent fact about the uses
to which some bad actors happen to put
the just war theory. Rather, it derives
partly from enduring facts about the
human condition and partly from the
just war theory’s core justificatory
requirements.” Eberle does allow that
a just war could be escalated by adding
additional war aims. However, given
human nature, this also becomes a
temptation to misuse the theory to seem
to justify escalated warfare and carnage
under the guise of avenging the nowexaggerated precipitating moral wrongs.
Here I believe Dr. Eberle overburdens
his analysis of just war theory with the
problem of human nature. According to
traditional Christian doctrine, humans
are sinful beings who often choose
apparent “goods” over actual goods. As
such, people can choose to misuse or
abuse any doctrine, theory, or instruction, no matter how ironclad. Still, I do
not consider a just war theory that is
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open to abuse to be a defective theory; if
anything, because of that potential it is
a realistic one. I highly recommend this
work as a useful resource for practical
moral formation in just war theory.
ALI GHAFFARI

Rockets and People, by Boris Chertok, ed. Asif
Siddiqi. Vol. 3, Hot Days of the Cold War. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, History Office, 2010. 796 pages.
$65.

In this third volume of his memoirs, ably
edited by acclaimed space historian Asif
Siddiqi, Boris Yevseyevich Chertok, who
was the most senior surviving Soviet
space engineer until his death at age
ninety-nine in 2011, offers a unique,
firsthand window into Cold War history
as he lived it over his six-decade career.
He spent most of it at the uppermost
level of the OKB-1 design bureau (now
S. P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia), where he participated
in every major project though 1991.
In this series, volume 1 details Chertok’s
rise from aviation factory electrician
to official in charge of extracting
Nazi rocket expertise, volume 2 the
post-1946 emergence of the Soviet
missile program. In volume 3, Chertok
recounts and reflects on the golden
age of Soviet cosmonautics, from Yury
Gagarin’s historic orbital flight in 1961
to the death of key figures in the Soviet
space program in and around 1967.
Volume 4, released in early 2012, covers
the U.S.-Soviet moon race. Chertok’s
personable, technically informed,
and somewhat politically detached
perspective, as well as his frankness
regarding credibility of sources and
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where he lacks information, makes for
an accessible, historically useful account.
From his perch in the Soviet missile
bureaucracy, Chertok observed the Cold
War as a scientific-technologicalmilitary competition. Manned spaceflight was regarded as an indicator
of national prestige—and socialist
superiority: “There was an ongoing
battle at the front line of the Cold War’s
scientific-technical front. Rather than
soldiers, it was scientists, engineers, the
‘generals’ of industry, and workers who
determined the battle’s outcome. And
warriors of another sort came on the
scene—cosmonauts” (p. 61). Each side
fed off the other in constant oneupmanship, Chertok stresses: “American
operations had a very strong effect on
our plans. American historians of aeronautics assert that our successes were the
primary reason why the United States
converted its space programs into a toppriority, nationwide challenge” (p. 246).
Central to this competition, for some
time, was a race to land a man on the
moon. On August 3, 1964, Central
Committee and USSR Council of
Ministers Resolution 655-268, “On
Work for Lunar and Space Research,”
recommitted Moscow to “land a man
on the moon and return him to Earth
by 1967–68” (p. 397). This goal was
restated in a similar decree of October
25, 1965 (p. 568). This competition was
very real, and there was no substitute:
“[N]o matter how successful [other]
programs might be, they could not
compensate for our loss of superiority
if the Americans were to become the
first to fly around the moon” (p. 523).
Then, despite suffering a major setback
in the Apollo 1 fire of 1967, the United
States started pulling ahead. The Soviet
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